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In a series of three publications from 1985, U.S. neurologist Norman Geschwind and his colleagues 
proposed that brain asymmetry and a vast array of human ‘abnormalities’ might have a shared cause. 
According to the theory, prenatal testosterone exposure regulates fetal brain development, and 
excessive levels of the hormone can lead to left-handedness, pigmentation anomalies, hair loss, immune 
disorders, migraine, scoliosis, dyslexia, stuttering, epilepsy, autism, homosexuality, and various other 
‘abnormal’ physical, mental, and behavioral characteristics. Geschwind produced virtually no 
experimental data to back his hypothesis. Proficient in eight languages, he based his model on a review 
of hundreds of publications from disciplines ranging from anatomy to zoology, dating from every decade 
since the 1860s. 
 
Based on archival collections and oral history interviews, this paper demonstrates how Geschwind’s 
interest in the history and philosophy of science inspired him to combine old and new knowledges. In 
doing so, Geschwind attempted to resurrect allegedly suppressed knowledge from the past and feed it 
back into the medico-scientific discourse to generate a grand unified theory of the human body and 
character. 
 
Geschwind referred to his integrative model as “naive speculations,” but this did not shield him from 
severe critique.11 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Geschwind and his colleagues presented aspects of 
their model to the medical and neuroscientific community with questionable success. Geschwind also 
published articles and presented papers on the history of neurology. In his communication and personal 
notes, he made explicit his Popperian under-standing of falsification and his firm belief in the 
teleological trajectory of science. Concretely, he favored highly reductionist theories, because he 
assumed that they can be proven wrong very quickly, which purportedly allows for rapid scientific 
progress. Faced with increasing opposition to his model of testosterone-induced brain lateralization, 
Geschwind slowly retreated from the scientific community. In 1984, before the hypothesis was 
published in full, he passed away at the age of 58. 
 
I suggest that Geschwind’s wish to revive older research paradigms in a reductionist fashion was 
grounded in his commitment to ‘objectivity’ and the growth of knowledge, but that it undermined his 
personal commitment to equality and respect for the individual. In his personal and professional life, for 
instance, Geschwind supported women and minorities. Moreover, he embraced German scholarship, 
although he was Jewish and had been stationed in Ger-many during World War II. As a proponent of 
‘objectivity’, Geschwind read scientific literature through a presentist lens and stripped the data of 
contextual information. To name a few examples, he ignored the subtext of colonialism and the fear of 
degeneration in late-19th-century anatomy, the eugenicist foundations of genetic theories of laterality, 
and the gender-stereotypical connotations of endocrinological research. In doing so, Geschwind distilled 
both forgotten and well-known research into a theory that essentialized sex/gender, sexual orientation, 
dis/ability, class, and race/ethnicity. 
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Geschwind’s habit of taking scientific literature at face value also caused epistemic in-consistencies in 
his model. By drawing on texts from a wide range of times, places, and disciplines, Geschwind mobilized 
incoherent concepts of ‘the brain’. The epistemic objects in Geschwind’s sources include anatomical, 
electrical, hormonal, and genetic brains. Each of these epistemic versions of ‘the brain’ has been 
assessed with a variety of methods, ranging from questionnaires to behavioral observation, and from 
brain imaging to lesion studies. In his attempt to synthesize more than a century of research on brain 
laterality, Geschwind glossed over these substantial differences. Most notably, this led to a tension 
between concepts of fixity and plasticity in Geschwind’s model. 
 
This case study illuminates a neurologists’ questionable appropriation of the history and philosophy of 
science in order to speed up the ‘evolution of knowledge’. Helge Kragh cautioned scientists years ago 
not to write the history of their own fields unless they have “learn[ed] the necessary historiographical 
skills.”2 Geschwind never underwent such training. Guided by an interest in the history of science, 
Geschwind appropriated past science in an attempt to resurrect suppressed knowledge and integrate all 
available literature into his theory. I posit that this move may have increased the epistemic incoherence 
of his hypothesis. Furthermore, his philo-sophical convictions (that is, his commitment to falsification, 
reductionism, and the rapid growth of knowledge) might have encouraged Geschwind to put forth a 
theory that essentialized ‘the other’ in U.S. neurology during the Cold War. I conclude with a 
consideration of the question: How can the history and philosophy of science prevent being 
appropriated to pro-mote simplistic scientific understandings of the ‘evolution of knowledge’? 
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